Amex in Context: Tracing the Application of the Rule of Reason to Vertical Restraints by Rooney, William H. et al.
  
 
AMEX IN CONTEXT: TRACING THE 
APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF REASON 
TO VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
William H. Rooney, Timothy G. Fleming, and Sruti 
Swaminathan* 
I. Introduction ..................................................................... 2 
II. Dr. Miles and the Age of Per Se Illegality ..................... 5 
III. GTE Sylvania and the New Focus on  
 Interbrand Competition .................................................. 7 
A. Background and Lower Court Decisions .................8 
B. The Supreme Court’s About-Face.............................9 
C. A New Focus on Interbrand  
 Competition ............................................................. 10 
D. Scholars’ Assessment.............................................. 12 
E. Expanding the Rule of Reason to  
 Vertical Maximum Price Restraints ..................... 12 
IV. Leegin and the Elimination of Per Se Illegality for 
Vertical Minimum Price Restraints ............................. 14 
A. The Pricing Dispute ................................................ 14 
B. The Supreme Court’s Review................................. 15 
V. The AmEx Decision ....................................................... 17 
A. The District Court Decision ................................... 19 
1. Background: The Parties, the  
 
* William H. Rooney is a partner of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP and 
the Co-Chair of the firm’s U.S. Antitrust Practice. Timothy G. Fleming is a 
fourth-year litigation associate at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP.  Sruti 
Swaminathan is a second-year associate at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. 
This Article represents the tentative thoughts of the authors and should not 
be construed as the position of any other person or entity, including Willkie 
Farr & Gallagher LLP or any of its clients. This Article is provided for news 
and informational purposes only and does not take into account the 
qualifications, exceptions, and other considerations that may be relevant to 
particular situations. Nothing contained herein constitutes, or is to be 
considered, the rendering of legal advice, generally or as to a specific matter, 
or a warranty of any kind. Readers are responsible for obtaining legal advice 
from their own legal counsel. The authors disclaim liability for any errors 
in, or any reliance upon, this information. 
  
2 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
 Platform, and the Restraints ............................ 19 
2. Defining the Market .......................................... 21 
3. Assessing Market Power ................................... 22 
4. The Competitive Assessment ........................... 24 
5. No Competitive Justification ............................ 25 
B. The Second Circuit Decision .................................. 27 
C. The Supreme Court Decision ................................. 30 
1. The Definition of the Market ............................ 30 
2. The Competitive Assessment ........................... 32 
VI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 34 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his 1911 State of the Union address, President William 
Howard Taft, the former and future jurist, discussed the 
development of antitrust law since the Sherman Act’s 
passage: “Slowly the mills of the courts ground, and only 
gradually did the majesty of the law assert itself.”1 While Taft 
allowed for the possibility that some changes to the law may 
be beneficial, he also argued that the “object” of the Act was 
“near achievement,” and spoke against those calling to 
“abandon this work of twenty years and try another 
experiment[.]”2 Ultimately, the experiment was not 
abandoned, and the Sherman Act remains at the center of 
antitrust law in the United States. 
Meanwhile, the “mills of the courts” have continued to 
grind away. Various judges, justices—including the eventual 
Chief Justice Taft himself3—and scholars have shaped the 
contours of antitrust law. One area of ongoing development is 
the organic rule of reason, which Taft played no small role in 
 
1 See William Howard Taft, President of the U.S., Third Annual 
Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (Dec. 5, 1911) 
(transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
29552 [perma.cc/ZK4K-EHB6]). At the time, the State of the Union 
consisted of written remarks delivered to Congress; it was not given in 
person. See id.  
2 Id.  
3 For example, in United States v. Gen. Elec., Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), 
Taft’s opinion bore upon the interplay of antitrust and agency law. 
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originating.4 The rule of reason was first articulated in United 
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.5 in 1898 and played an 
important role, not long after, in the titanic cases of Standard 
Oil of New Jersey v. United States6 and United States v. 
American Tobacco Co.7 During Taft’s presidency, however, the 
Supreme Court held that vertically imposed price restraints 
were per se illegal,8 and, over the decades that followed, the 
rule of reason began to wither and was gradually replaced, in 
significant part, by a series of per se rules. 
In the late 1970s, however, the rule of reason was reborn 
when the Supreme Court overruled a decision rendered only 
ten years earlier.9 That renaissance evolved in the ensuing 
decades into a clear focus on interbrand competition and a 
directive to capture the full effects of vertical restraints on 
competition in the relevant market.10 In 2007, the Court held 
that even vertical minimum price restraints should be 
evaluated under the rule of reason.11 
The most recent development in the application of the rule 
of reason to vertical restraints involved two-sided 
 
4 For a more detailed summary of the rule of reason, and William 
Howard Taft’s place in its development, please see William H. Rooney & 
Timothy G. Fleming, Introduction: William Howard Taft, The Origin of the 
Rule of Reason, and the Actavis Challenge, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 
(2018).  
5 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291–93 
(6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
6 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66–67 
(1911). 
7 See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178–79 (1911). 
8 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007). 
9 See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 
(1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967)). 
10 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997). 
11 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
882 (2007). 
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transactional platforms,12 which are becoming increasingly 
common in the internet age. The transactional platform 
reviewed by the Court, however, arose in the “old-school” 
world of plastic credit cards and resulted in the landmark 
decision of Ohio v. American Express Co.13 There, the Court 
maintained its focus on interbrand competition and aggregate 
competitive impact by reviewing the analytical framework 
within which the case had been decided by the district court: 
the definition of the relevant market and the unit of output 
that serves as a barometer for competition in that market.14  
The Court held that the relevant market in which to assess 
a vertical restraint that is ancillary to a transactional 
platform should consist of the transactions that are 
consummated by the platform.15 The restraint—whether on 
merchants or on cardholders—should be assessed by its 
impact on the volume and price of the relevant output, i.e. the 
transactions consummated by the platform and those by 
competing platforms.16  
The Court then reviewed—through the newly defined legal 
framework—the evidence that had been submitted in the case 
and concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of 
demonstrating a reduction of output or increase in price of the 
relevant credit-card transactions.17 The decision marked a 
further step in the evolution of the organic rule of reason in 
the complex and dynamic competitive conditions that are 
typical of the modern economy.  
 
12 In a two-sided platform, a business “provide[s] a common (real or 
virtual) meeting place and . . . facilitate[s] interactions between members of 
. . . two distinct customer groups.” David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 
Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 667, 667 (2008). In two-sided transactional platforms, as discussed 
in this Article, those interactions consist of commercial transactions, and a 
platform cannot make a sale to one side without simultaneously selling to 
the other. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct 2274, 2280 (2018).   
13 Am. Express Co, 138 S. Ct 2274 (2018).   
14 See id. at 2286–87. 
15 Id. at 2285–86. 
16 Id. at 2286. 
17 Id. at 2289–90.  
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II. DR. MILES AND THE AGE OF PER SE 
ILLEGALITY 
During President Taft’s term, the Supreme Court authored 
several crucial antitrust opinions. One of them, Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. (“Dr. Miles”),18 would 
prove especially controversial. Judge and antitrust scholar 
Robert Bork would later refer to one paragraph in the decision 
as a “decisive misstep that has controlled a whole body of 
law.”19 In Dr. Miles, a medicine company’s agreements with 
“jobbers and wholesale druggists” set the price of the drugs 
not only for sales to those jobbers and wholesale druggists, 
“but also the wholesale and retail prices.”20 The company, Dr. 
Miles Medical Co. (“Dr. Miles”), sued a wholesale drug 
business for acquiring Dr. Miles’s medicines and selling them 
at less than the price Dr. Miles had set.21  
The Supreme Court, affirming a lower court’s dismissal, 
found that the resale price-setting itself was illegal. Citing to 
principles of contract law, the Court found a lack of support 
for the proposition that a manufacturer “may impose upon 
purchasers every sort of restriction.” To wit: “[A] general 
restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid.”22  
The Court found that, in restricting trade through those 
agreements, Dr. Miles could “fare no better with its plan of 
identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they 
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same 
restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by 
agreement with each other.”23 Thus, ignoring any difference 
in horizontal and vertical restraints, the Court concluded that 
 
18 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), 
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877 (2007). 
19 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 32 (2d ed. 1993). 
20 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374. 
21 Id. at 382. 
22 Id. at 404. 
23 Id. at 408. 
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“[t]he complainant having sold its product at prices 
satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever 
advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent 
traffic.”24 
Professor Bork admired Taft’s antitrust jurisprudence25 
but had no such fondness for the Dr. Miles opinion. He 
asserted that the opinion did not clarify “whether the 
arrangement was truly vertical . . . or the result of pressure 
upward from a horizontal agreement among the resellers.”26 
Bork argued that Justice Hughes’s opinion in Dr. Miles 
suffered from an error: The “implausible assumption that a 
manufacturer’s interest in eliminating price rivalry among its 
resellers must have the same motives and consequences as the 
interest of resellers in forming a cartel.”27 Bork, however, 
believed that “Dr. Miles, unless it was being coerced by a 
reseller cartel, could have had no interest in creating a 
monopoly profit for its resellers at its own expense.”28 The per 
se rule, Bork argued, was “created on an erroneous economic 
assumption.”29 
The adoption of a per se rule in Dr. Miles foreshadowed a 
general decline in courts’ use of the rule of reason. For 
decades, “the rule of reason [was] almost completely replaced 
by a comprehensive network of per se rules.”30 For example, 
in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (“Schwinn”),31 the 
Court held that vertically imposed “territorial restrictions 
upon resale” of goods, as well as “restrictions of outlets with 
which the distributors may deal and . . . restraints upon 
retailers to whom the goods are sold[,]” were per se Sherman 
 
24 Id. at 409. 
25 See BORK, supra note 19, at 26–30. 
26 Id. at 33.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious 
Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 337 (2000). 
31 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), 
overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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Act violations.32 “Under the Sherman Act,” the Court found, 
“it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek 
to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article 
may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with 
dominion over it.”33  
The mills continued to grind, however, and a decade after 
Schwinn, a sea change in antitrust jurisprudence arrived.   
III. GTE SYLVANIA AND THE NEW FOCUS ON 
INTERBRAND COMPETITION 
While the Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc. (“GTE Sylvania”) purported to “return” to the state of law 
prior to the aberration that was Schwinn,34 Timothy Muris, 
former Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Chair and current 
George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law, has 
characterized the opinion as “a stark departure from prior 
law.”35 The GTE Sylvania Court, according to Muris, 
“abandoned the . . . effort to broaden per se rules . . . 
abandoned noneconomic goals, such as dealer autonomy, and 
clearly grounded antitrust analysis upon the economic impact 
of restraints on consumers . . . . [T]he Court made clear that 
. . . restraints must be judged on ‘demonstrable economic 
effect.’”36 
By turning the focus squarely onto economic effects, the 
Court paved the way for subsequent effects-driven rule of 
reason analysis. The idiosyncratic contours of the watershed 
GTE Sylvania opinion warrant some exploration. 
 
32 Id. at 379.  
33 Id.  
34 GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.  
35 Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of 
Antitrust, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 902 (2001). 
36 Id.  
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A. Background and Lower Court Decisions 
GTE Sylvania Inc. (“Sylvania”) manufactured and sold 
television sets.37 Around fifteen years prior to the Supreme 
Court decision, Sylvania shifted its sales strategy and began 
“sell[ing] its televisions directly to a smaller and more select 
group of franchised retailers.”38 With the “hope of attracting 
the more aggressive and competent retailers thought 
necessary to the improvement of the company’s market 
position[,]” Sylvania “limited the number of franchises 
granted for any given area and required each franchisee to sell 
his Sylvania products only from the location or locations at 
which he was franchised.”39 This model allowed Sylvania to 
increase its market share.40   
In 1965, Sylvania became embroiled in a dispute with one 
of its franchisees, Continental T.V., Inc. (“Continental”), after 
Sylvania permitted one of Continental’s rivals to sell Sylvania 
televisions near a Continental franchise.41 Continental 
protested the new franchise, cancelled a Sylvania order, and 
placed an order with a Sylvania rival.42 Continental 
eventually announced a plan to open a store in Sacramento 
and sell Sylvania products there, despite Sylvania’s 
withholding permission.43 The dispute spiraled and soon led 
to litigation in which, in cross-claims, Continental accused 
Sylvania of violating section 1 “of the Sherman Act by entering 
into and enforcing franchise agreements that prohibited the 
sale of Sylvania products other than from specified 
locations.”44 
After a trial, the district court instructed the jury that, if it 
found Sylvania had entered into an agreement “with one or 
more of its dealers pursuant to which Sylvania exercised 
 
37 See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38.  
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 See id. at 38–39.  
41 See id. at 39.  
42 See id. 
43 See id.  
44 Id. at 40.  
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dominion or control over the products sold to the dealer . . . 
you must find any effort thereafter to restrict outlets or store 
locations from which its dealers resold the merchandise” to be 
a Sherman Act violation.45 The jury so found, but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed.46 While bound by Schwinn, the Circuit Court 
found “that Sylvania’s location restriction had less potential 
for competitive harm than the restrictions invalidated in 
Schwinn and thus should be judged under the ‘rule of reason’ 
rather than the per se rule stated in Schwinn.”47 
B. The Supreme Court’s About-Face 
The Supreme Court announced it was “unable to find a 
principled basis for distinguishing” the earlier Schwinn 
decision.48 The Court continued: “In intent and competitive 
impact, the retail-customer restriction [i]n Schwinn is 
indistinguishable from the location restriction in the present 
case. In both cases the restrictions limited the freedom of the 
retailer to dispose of the purchased products as he desired.”49 
The Court then turned to whether the per se rule found in 
Schwinn was justified, and, remarkably, found that it was not.  
Marking the beginning of what would become a decades-
long erosion of the breadth of the per se rule, the Court 
observed that “[p]er se rules of illegality are appropriate only 
when they relate to conduct that is manifestly 
anticompetitive.”50 Agreements were per se illegal if they had 
a “pernicious effect on competition and lack . . . any redeeming 
virtue.”51 Only four years prior to Schwinn, the Court found 
that the rule of reason was appropriate for vertical restraints 
due to “uncertainty” as to whether vertical restraints met the 
 
45 Id. at 40–41 (internal quotations omitted).  
46 See id. at 41.  
47 Id.   
48 Id. at 46.  
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 49–50.  
51 Id. at 50 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958)). 
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per se standard, and the Schwinn court “announced its 
sweeping per se rule without even a reference to [Northern 
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States] and with no explanation 
of its sudden change in position.”52 The GTE Sylvania court 
therefore set out to undertake such an analysis.  
Justice Powell began by stating that “[t]he market impact 
of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for 
a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and 
stimulation of interbrand competition[,]” and that “the Court 
in Schwinn did not distinguish among the challenged 
restrictions on the basis of their individual potential for 
intrabrand harm or interbrand benefit.”53 Instead, the 
Schwinn court distinguished between agreements where title 
to the goods passed and agreements where title did not pass; 
in the former circumstance a per se rule applied, while the 
rule of reason applied in the latter.54 The Court found “no 
analytical support” for the distinction in the Schwinn opinion, 
or even an “assertion . . . that the competitive impact of 
vertical restrictions is significantly affected by the form of the 
transaction.”55  
C. A New Focus on Interbrand Competition 
The GTE Sylvania Court examined the intrabrand and 
interbrand effects of the restraints at issue. “Vertical 
restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the 
number of sellers of a particular product competing for the 
business of a given group of buyers[,]” the Court noted, and 
further stated that “[l]ocation restrictions have this effect 
because of practical constraints on the effective marketing 
area of retail outlets.”56 However, the Court found that, 
“[a]lthough intrabrand competition may be reduced, the 
ability of retailers to exploit the resulting market may be 
 
52 Id. at 50–51 (citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 
(1963)). 
53 Id. at 51–52. 
54 See id. at 52. 
55 Id. at 54.  
56 Id.  
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limited both by the ability of consumers to travel to other 
franchised locations and, perhaps more importantly, to 
purchase the competing products of other manufacturers.”57 
In contrast to Schwinn, the impact did not, the Court found, 
depend on whether the title to the goods passed or not.58  
The Court then turned to the procompetitive benefits of the 
vertical restrictions. “Vertical restrictions promote interbrand 
competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain 
efficiencies in the distribution of his products.”59 Justice 
Powell wrote that “new manufacturers and manufacturers 
entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to 
induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of 
investment of capital and labor that is often required in the 
distribution of products unknown to the consumer[,]” while 
“[e]stablished manufacturers can use them to induce retailers 
to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and 
repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their 
products.”60 Furthermore, as the Court noted, some 
economists “argued that manufacturers have an economic 
interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is 
consistent with the efficient distribution of their products.”61  
The Court rejected the distinction between “sale and 
nonsale transactions” that the Schwinn Court applied.62 
Turning to vertical restraints generally, the Court found that 
they were “widely used in our free market economy[,]” that 
“there is substantial scholarly and judicial authority 
supporting their economic utility[,]” and that “[t]here is 
relatively little authority to the contrary.”63 The Court 
therefore overruled Schwinn and “return[ed] to the rule of 
reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn.”64 
 
57 Id.  
58 See id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 55.  
61 Id. at 56.  
62 Id. at 57.   
63 Id. at 57–58.  
64 Id. at 58–59.  
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D. Scholars’ Assessment 
Writing in the near-immediate aftermath of GTE 
Sylvania, Professor Bork argued that the opinion “displays a 
far higher degree of economic sophistication” than did prior 
decisions, and offered an “approach that, generally applied, is 
capable of making antitrust a rational, proconsumer policy 
once more.”65 He noted that both the majority and 
concurrence “gave weight to business efficiency in framing 
their respective rules” and bemoaned the fact that “[f]or years 
the Court has denigrated business efficiency[.]”66 Professor 
Bork then expressed a hope that “[GTE] Sylvania may 
presage a general reformation of a policy gone astray.”67  
Writing at a greater remove than Professor Bork, Professor 
Muris called GTE Sylvania a “milestone” that “firmly 
grounded antitrust on economic analysis.”68 Muris predicted 
that, in the wake of GTE Sylvania, subsequent “controversies” 
in antitrust would be decided “based upon empirical 
evidence.”69 
E. Expanding the Rule of Reason to Vertical Maximum 
Price Restraints 
Only two decades after GTE Sylvania was decided, the 
Supreme Court jettisoned another vertical per se rule.70 In the 
1968 decision of Albrecht v. Herald Co., decided in the 
immediate wake of the Schwinn decision and the increasing 
momentum that Schwinn exerted in favor of per se liability, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the application of the per se rule 
to vertical maximum price restraints.71  
By 1997, however, a reconsideration of that rule was 
approaching. In Kahn v. State Oil, the Seventh Circuit 
 
65 BORK, supra note 19, at 287.  
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Muris, supra note 35, at 911.  
69 Id. at 912.  
70 State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 13–18 (1997). 
71 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 
(1997). 
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determined that “[the defendant had] engaged in [vertical] 
maximum price fixing,”72 which, in light of Albrecht, left the 
Seventh Circuit little room to maneuver. Writing for the court, 
Judge Richard Posner described Albrecht as “unsound when 
decided” and “inconsistent with later Supreme Court 
decisions.”73 Among those decisions was GTE Sylvania.74   
Judge Posner further opined that “[Albrecht] should be 
overruled. Someday, we expect it will be.”75 In the meantime, 
however, the Seventh Circuit applied the per se rule and 
found for the plaintiff. State Oil sought certiorari, and the 
Supreme Court accepted Judge Posner’s invitation to 
reconsider Albrecht.76 
The State Oil Court noted that its prior decisions "have 
hinted that the analytical underpinnings of Albrecht were 
substantially weakened by GTE Sylvania.”77 Informed by the 
“general view that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws 
is to protect interbrand competition,” the Court concluded that 
"it [was] difficult to maintain that vertically imposed 
maximum prices could harm consumers or competition to the 
extent necessary to justify their per se invalidation.”78  
“After reconsidering Albrecht’s rationale and the 
substantial criticism the decision has received,” the Court 
found “insufficient economic justification for per se 
invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing.”79 With that 
1997 holding, the Court moved another category of vertical 
restraints into the realm of the rule of reason where the 
restraint would be assessed according to its aggregate impact 
on interbrand competition.   
 
72 Kahn v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 
U.S. 3 (1997). 
73 Id. at 1363.   
74 Id. (discussing GTE Sylvania’s overruling of Schwinn). 
75 Id. 
76 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 519 U.S. 1107 (1997) (granting cert.).   
77 State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 14 (1997). 
78 Id. at 15.   
79 Id. at 18.     
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IV. LEEGIN AND THE ELIMINATION OF PER SE 
ILLEGALITY FOR VERTICAL MINIMUM PRICE 
RESTRAINTS 
The increased focus on economic effects and interbrand 
competition that State Oil reflected led ten years later to the 
Court’s overruling per se liability for vertical minimum price 
restraints, nearly a century after that rule was adopted in Dr. 
Miles. In 2007, the Supreme Court, in Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (“Leegin”),80 noted that prior 
courts had “abandoned the rule of per se illegality for other 
vertical restraints a manufacturer imposes on its distributors” 
and that “[r]espected economic analysts . . . [have] conclude[d] 
that vertical [minimum] price restraints can have 
procompetitive effects.”81 The restraints should therefore “be 
judged by the rule of reason.”82  
A. The Pricing Dispute 
Leegin, a leather goods manufacturer, sold “a variety of 
women’s fashion accessories” under its Brighton brand.83 The 
brand was mostly sold to “smaller retailers,” as Leegin’s 
president believed such retailers “treat customers better” 
than larger retailers.84 PSKS, Inc. operated Kay’s Kloset, a 
women’s apparel store in Texas; “Brighton was the store’s 
most important brand[.]”85  
In 1997, Leegin began refusing to “sell to retailers that 
discounted Brighton goods below suggested prices.”86 Leegin 
claimed it “adopted the policy to give its retailers sufficient 
margins to provide customers the service central to its 
distribution strategy. It also expressed concern that 
 
80 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 
(2007).  
81 Id. at 882. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See id.  
85 Id. at 882–83. 
86 Id. at 883. 
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discounting harmed Brighton’s brand image and 
reputation.”87 
Leegin had another initiative in which stores received 
certain benefits in exchange for, among other things, 
promising “to sell at Leegin’s suggested prices.”88 Kay’s Kloset 
was such a store, but was excluded from the initiative “[a]fter 
a Leegin employee visited the store and found it 
unattractive[.]”89 Kay’s Kloset began selling Brighton goods at 
discounted prices, claiming it needed to do so to compete with 
retailers who were undercutting it.90 Eventually, after a 
request to end the discounting was rebuffed, Leegin stopped 
selling to Kay’s Kloset.91  
PSKS sued Leegin, arguing that the prohibition on 
discounts and the associated incentive program amounted to 
price-fixing.92 The district court excluded expert testimony on 
the procompetitive benefits of the policy, “relying on the per se 
rule established by Dr. Miles.”93 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.94 
B. The Supreme Court’s Review 
The Leegin Court attacked the rationale underlying Dr. 
Miles. Leegin criticized the Dr. Miles Court for “relying on the 
common-law rule against restraints on alienation” and 
thereby “justif[ying] its decision based on ‘formalistic’ legal 
doctrine rather than ‘demonstrable economic effect.’”95 In a 
similar vein, Leegin observed that the Dr. Miles Court “relied 
on a treatise published in 1628 [for the rule against restraints 
on alienation], but failed to discuss in detail the business 
 
87 See id. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 883–84.  
90 Id. at 884. 
91 Id. 
92 See id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 884–85.  
95 Id. at 887–88 (quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36, 58–59 (1977)). 
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reasons that would motivate a manufacturer situated in 1911 
to make use of vertical price restraints.”96  
The Court also noted that cases subsequent to Dr. Miles 
“rejected the approach of reliance on rules governing 
horizontal restraints when defining rules applicable to 
vertical ones.”97 The Court therefore examined, “in the first 
instance, the economic effects of vertical agreements to fix 
minimum resale prices, and . . . whether the per se rule is 
nonetheless appropriate.”98  
The Court found that “economics literature is replete with 
procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer’s use of 
resale price maintenance.”99 In considering those 
justifications, the Court found that “[a] single manufacturer’s 
use of vertical price restraints tends to eliminate intrabrand 
price competition; this in turn encourages retailers to invest 
in tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that 
aid the manufacturer’s position as against rival [interbrand] 
manufacturers.”100 Vertical price restraints also have the 
“potential to give consumers more options so that they can 
choose among low-price, low-service brands; high-price, high-
service brands; and brands that fall in between.”101 
The Court further found that, “[a]bsent vertical price 
restraints[,] . . . discounting retailers can free ride on retailers 
who furnish services and then capture some of the increased 
demand those services generate.”102 In addition, the 
restraints at issue could “facilitat[e] market entry for new 
firms and brands” and “encourag[e] retailer services that 
would not be provided even absent free riding.”103 The Court, 
however, did accept that vertical price restraints could 
facilitate either wholesaler or retailer cartels, or be “abused 
 
96 Id. at 888.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 889.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 890 (emphasis added).  
101 Id.  
102 Id. (citing Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 
(1977)). 
103 Id. at 891–92.  
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by a powerful manufacturer or retailer.”104 Nonetheless, the 
Court found that, because the effect of the restraints would 
not “always or almost always” have an anticompetitive effect, 
and because a per se rule would “proscribe a significant 
amount of procompetitive conduct, these agreements appear 
ill suited for per se condemnation.”105  
The Court rejected PSKS’s argument that “vertical price 
restraints should be per se unlawful because of the 
administrative convenience of per se rules,” and instead found 
that a reduction in costs, on its own, was insufficient to justify 
the rule.106 PSKS also noted that the restraint could “lead to 
higher prices”; the Court found that, in prior cases, vertical 
restraints had been evaluated under the rule of reason “even 
though prices can be increased in the course of promoting 
procompetitive effects.”107 The Court also found that PSKS 
had failed to account for ways in which the restraint could 
lead to lower prices.108 After a comprehensive discussion, the 
Court found the stare decisis arguments unpersuasive, 
overruled Dr. Miles, and held “[v]ertical price restraints are to 
be judged according to the rule of reason.”109 
V. THE AMEX DECISION 
With the rule of reason firmly established as the standard 
for evaluating vertical restraints, the Supreme Court 
confronted the competitive complexity typical of our modern 
economy in Ohio v. American Express Co. (“Amex”).110 The 
case involved the “platform” of credit cards and the dynamic 
efforts of a credit-card network—here, American Express—to 
 
104 Id. at 892–93.  
105 Id. at 894 (internal quotations omitted). 
106 Id. at 894–95. 
107 Id. at 895–96.  
108 See id. at 896. 
109 Id. at 907.  
110 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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attract merchants and cardholders to maximize credit-card 
transactions from which American Express collected a fee.111 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York characterized the credit-card “network services” 
ecosystem as a “two-sided platform” catering to cardholders 
on one side and merchants on the other.112 The district court 
found that certain antisteering113 provisions, or 
nondiscrimination provisions (“NDPs”), restricted interbrand 
competition in the “network services market,” in which credit 
cards compete to sell “acceptance services” utilized by 
merchants.114 The district court held that “[p]roof of 
anticompetitive harm to merchants, the primary consumers of 
American Express’s network services, [was] sufficient to 
discharge Plaintiffs’ burden in this case[,]” although it also 
found harm to cardholders.115  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the 
ground that the district court had taken too narrow a view of 
the relevant market and that the markets for consumer 
services and merchant services needed to be considered as 
part of a single, “two-sided” transactional market.116 The 
Second Circuit held that “the Plaintiffs’ initial burden was to 
show that the NDPs made all Amex consumers on both sides 
 
111 See id. at 2280–83. 
112 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 150–51 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
113 The district court and Second Circuit used the styling “anti-
steering.” See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (stating that the 
defendants chose to litigate “[p]laintiffs’ challenge to their anti-steering 
rules[.]”); United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 192 (2d Cir. 
2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) 
(“Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that absent the anti-steering 
provisions . . . .”). This Article omits the hyphen in “anti-steering” in 
accordance with the Supreme Court’s styling. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. 
Ct at 2280 (“Amex requires the merchant to agree to an antisteering 
contractual provision.”). 
114 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 151. 
115 Id. at 208.  
116 Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 197–200. 
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of the platform—i.e., both merchants and cardholders—worse 
off overall” and that Plaintiffs failed to meet that burden.117  
The Supreme Court affirmed, validating the concept of a 
two-sided transactional market and retaining the focus under 
the rule of reason on interbrand competition and aggregate 
output.118 The Court found that “Amex’s business model has 
spurred robust interbrand competition and has increased the 
quality and quantity of credit-card transactions.”119  
A. The District Court Decision 
1. Background: The Parties, the Platform, and 
the Restraints 
The United States and seventeen states (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs” or the “Government”) brought suit against various 
credit-card companies challenging certain restraints found in 
agreements with merchants.120 All credit-card companies 
other than American Express Company (“American Express” 
or “Amex”) and American Express Travel Related Services 
Company (collectively, “Defendants”) settled.121  
The district court began its analysis by determining 
whether to characterize the platform for credit-card 
transactions as single-sided or multi-sided.122 The district 
court accepted that credit-card transactions occurred on a 
“two-sided platform” but found that the platform consisted of 
“two separate, yet deeply interrelated, markets: a market for 
card issuance, in which Amex and Discover compete with 
thousands of Visa- and MasterCard-issuing banks; and a 
network services market, in which Visa, MasterCard, Amex, 
 
117 Id. at 205–06.  
118 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289.  
119 Id. at 2290.  
120 Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 149–50. 
121 Id. at 149. 
122 See id. at 154 (stating that “[i]n a two-sided platform, a single firm 
or collection of firms sells different products or services to two separate yet 
interrelated groups of customers who, in turn, rely on the platform to 
intermediate some type of interaction between them”). 
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and Discover compete to sell acceptance services.”123 Despite 
the interaction of cardholders and merchants in the “network 
services” market, the district court maintained that 
cardholders and merchants were participants in distinct 
markets.124  
The district court did, however, acknowledge the 
interrelationship of the markets, saying: “American Express 
. . . provides cardholders with card-payment services and 
merchants with card-acceptance services in order to facilitate 
transactions between the two.”125 American Express “provides 
these services simultaneously; for every unit of payment 
services sold to the cardholder at the moment of purchase, a 
matching service is sold to the merchant in order to execute 
the transaction, and vice versa.”126 
At issue were provisions in American Express’s “standard 
card acceptance agreements” with merchants.127 The 
provisions prevented merchants from: 
offering discounts or other monetary incentives to 
customers who pay with a particular type of card, 
offering non-monetary benefits for using a lower-cost 
card, displaying the logo of one brand more 
prominently than others, expressing the merchants’ 
preference as to which type of card it would rather 
accept, or posting each card’s cost of acceptance and 
letting customers make their own decisions as to 
which mode of payment they prefer.128 
The court found that “[i]n practice, the NDPs operate to 
block Amex-accepting merchants from encouraging their 
customers to use any credit or charge card other than an 
American Express card, even where that card is less expensive 
for the merchant to accept.”129 
 
123 Id. at 151 (emphasis added). 
124 Id. at 150–51. 
125 Id. at 155.  
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 162. 
128 Id. at 165.  
129 Id.  
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The district court described the NDPs as vertical 
restraints.130 The line of vertical cases reviewed above and 
their principles regarding interbrand competition and 
aggregate economic effects were thus relevant to the 
restraints at issue.  
The district court determined that, as “non-price vertical 
restraints between firms at different levels of production[,]” 
the NDPs were “properly analyzed under the rule of 
reason.”131 The court distinguished the restraints from “most 
vertical distribution agreements between 
manufacturers/suppliers or dealers/distributors,” explicitly 
citing to GTE Sylvania and Leegin, in that they “d[id] not 
purport to restrain intrabrand competition in favor of greater 
interbrand competition.”132 Rather, “Amex’s anti-steering 
rules admittedly have the primary effect of restraining one 
form of interbrand competition among the [general purpose 
credit and charge] card networks in favor of alternative forms 
of interbrand competition.”133 
2. Defining the Market 
The district court held that “the relevant product market 
for purposes of its analysis of Amex’s NDPs is the market for 
general purpose credit and charge card network services.”134 
American Express “urged the court . . . to define the relevant 
product market in terms of ‘transactions,’ rather than 
network services.”135 Such a definition, according to the court, 
would “take[] the concept of two-sidedness too far.”136 The 
opinion found: 
 
130 Id. at 167 (characterizing the restraints as non-price vertical 
restraints); id. at 228 n.52 (noting American Express described the 
restraints as vertical). The court gave no indication that the government 
challenged this characterization.   
131 Id. at 167. 
132 Id. at 168.  
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 174.  
135 Id. at 172.  
136 Id.  
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Competition in the GPCC card industry occurs on at 
least two distinct yet interrelated levels: (1) at the 
card issuance level, where American Express and 
Discover compete against each other and against the 
thousands of Visa- and MasterCard-issuing banks; 
and (2) at the network services level, where Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express, and Discover 
compete.137 
The court held that “[t]o conflate these separate avenues of 
competition into a single product market for ‘transactions’ 
that is coextensive with the platform itself, as Defendants 
encourage, would impermissibly and unnecessarily frustrate 
the court’s analysis in this case.”138 Instead, the court held: 
The network services market is a distinct product 
market for purposes of antitrust analysis, and a firm’s 
conduct therein may be separately scrutinized under 
the Sherman Act, provided the court recognizes and 
accounts for the fact that such conduct may indirectly 
affect competition at another level within the GPCC 
platform.139   
3. Assessing Market Power 
Having defined the market, the district court found that 
“American Express’s percentage share of the network services 
market is compelling evidence of market power.”140 The court 
found that “the proper metric for assigning market shares 
among the four GPCC networks is the dollar value of the 
transactions facilitated on those networks.”141 On that unit of 
measurement, “American Express is the second largest GPCC 
card network,” commanding a 26.4% market share, compared 
to a 45% share for Visa, a 23.3% share for MasterCard, and a 
5.3% share for Discover.142  
 
137 Id. at 172–73.  
138 Id. at 173.  
139 Id. at 173–74.  
140 Id. at 188.  
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
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The court rejected other proposed “measures of a network’s 
size, such as the number of cards in circulation, the breadth 
of [the network’s] merchant acceptance network . . . and the 
total number of transactions[.]”143 The court found that, while 
those measures would “affect [a] firm’s ability to compete in a 
market characterized by network effects, charge volume is the 
most direct measure of output in this particular market, and 
is also the primary determinant of the remuneration networks 
receive from merchants in exchange for network services.”144 
Notably, the output measure selected by the district court for 
market share calculation was similar to, or effectively the 
same as, the output measure (i.e, transaction-based) that the 
Second Circuit and Supreme Court used to assess competitive 
effects.  
The court acknowledged that “Amex’s market share alone 
likely would not suffice to prove market power by a 
preponderance of the evidence were it not for the amplifying 
effect of cardholder insistence.”145 According to the district 
court, merchants’ ability “to resist potential anticompetitive 
behavior by Amex . . . is severely impeded by the segment of 
Amex’s cardholder base who insist on paying with their Amex 
cards and who would shop elsewhere or spend less if unable 
to use their cards of choice.”146 While cardholder insistence 
derived from “a variety of sources,” the most important was 
the “robust rewards programs offered by the network.”147 The 
court accepted merchant testimony that “[t]he foregone profits 
associated with losing Amex-insistent customers rendered 
dropping Amex commercially impractical.”148 
The court concluded that “American Express possesses 
sufficient market power in the general-purpose credit and 
charge card network services market to satisfy Plaintiffs’ 
 
143 Id. at 189. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 191 (emphasis added).  
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 192.  
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initial burden under the rule of reason.”149 Although 
cardholder insistence was integral to the district court’s 
finding of market power, cardholder participation in credit-
card transactions was not considered in the district court’s 
competitive assessment.  
4. The Competitive Assessment 
According to the district court, Amex’s “merchant 
restraints sever the essential link between the price and sales 
of network services by denying merchants the opportunity to 
influence their customers’ payment decisions and thereby 
shift spending to less expensive cards.”150 The court further 
found that, “by disrupting the price-setting mechanism 
ordinarily present in competitive markets, the NDPs reduce 
American Express’s incentive . . . to offer merchants lower 
discount rates and, as a result, they impede a significant 
avenue of horizontal interbrand competition in the network 
services market.”151   
The court concluded that “the challenged restraints have 
impaired the competitive process in the network services 
market, rendering low-price business models untenable, 
stunting innovation, and resulting in higher prices for 
merchants and their consumers.”152 The competitive-effects 
analysis focused on the prices charged to merchants and, 
indirectly, on the prices that merchants charged to their 
consumers. The district court did not consider the impact of 
the challenged restraints on the metric of output that the 
court used to assess market share and power, which was the 
value of transactions consummated by the credit-card 
networks.   
 
149 Id. at 207.  
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 207–08.  
152 Id. at 208.  
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5. No Competitive Justification 
The district court was not persuaded by the procompetitive 
justifications with which Amex responded. Amex first 
“propose[d] that its [antisteering] rules are necessary to 
ensure its cardholders enjoy a frictionless and consistent 
point-of-sale experience when using their American Express 
cards—what the network terms ‘welcome acceptance’—which 
it asserts is critical to the survival of Amex’s differentiated 
business model.”153 Amex’s argument effectively invoked the 
cardholder-insistence, amplifying factor that was central to 
the court’s finding of Amex’s market power: The NDPs were 
necessary to maximize Amex’s completed transactions in 
competition with other cards (and cash) in the credit-card 
transactional market. 
But the court noted that, “[t]o the extent Defendants 
maintain that the NDPs drive interbrand competition in the 
credit-card industry, they focus primarily on the interrelated 
card issuance market[,]”154 thereby anticipating the focus of 
the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court. The district court 
found no support for the proposition that a restraint that 
“effectively blocks interbrand competition on price across an 
entire market may be justified . . . because the defendant firm 
would be less able to compete effectively in its absence.”155 
The court further found that the defense “would . . . require 
the court to balance the restraints’ pro-competitive effect in a 
separate, though intertwined, antitrust market against their 
anticompetitive effect on the merchant side of the GPCC 
platform[.]”156 The restraints “shift[ed] the bulk of interbrand 
competition in the credit and charge card industry to the 
cardholder side of the platform.”157 The court noted the 
general rule that “a restraint that causes anticompetitive 
 
153 Id. at 225. 
154 Id. at 227. 
155 Id. at 227–28. 
156 Id. at 229.  
157 Id.  
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harm in one market may not be justified by greater 
competition in a different market.”158  
The district court noted that the Second Circuit had not 
explicitly decided if the rule “precludes jointly weighing the 
relative gains and losses to interbrand competition in two 
separate, yet interrelated, markets that together comprise a 
single two-sided platform.”159 However, even if effects in the 
two markets could be weighed against each other, 
“Defendants have failed to establish that the NDPs are 
reasonably necessary to robust competition on the cardholder 
side of the GPCC platform, or that any such gains offset the 
harm done in the network services market.”160 The court also 
found that American Express’s concerns about the impact of 
removing the NDPs were “not supported by the evidentiary 
record.”161 
The district court rejected American Express’s argument 
that the restraints “reduc[e] merchants’ ability to ‘free-ride’ on 
the network’s various investments in its merchant and 
cardholder value propositions.”162 The court, however, found 
that, “to the extent Defendants have identified potential 
avenues of free-riding foreclosed by its NDPs, the court finds 
that the competitive benefits of preventing these forms of 
merchant behavior do not offset the significantly more 
pervasive harms done to interbrand competition by the same 
restraints.”163  
In light of the above, the district court roundly condemned 
the NPDs as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act under 
the rule of reason. The stage was well-set for the Second 
Circuit and the Supreme Court to re-examine the application 
of the rule of reason to vertical restraints that are purportedly 
designed to maximize platform transactions and to introduce 
the next major development in rule of reason jurisprudence.  
 
158 Id.  
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 229–30.  
161 Id. at 230. 
162 Id. at 234.  
163 Id. at 235.  
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B. The Second Circuit Decision 
The Second Circuit reversed, finding that “[t]he District 
Court’s definition of the relevant market in this case is fatal 
to its conclusion[.]”164 The court found that “analyzing the 
effect of Amex’s vertical restraints on the market for network 
services while ignoring their effect on the market for general 
purpose cards []ignores the two markets’ interdependence.”165 
Further, “[s]eparating the two markets allows legitimate 
competitive activities in the market for general [purpose 
cards] to be penalized no matter how output-expanding such 
activities may be.”166   
The Second Circuit recast what the district court had seen 
as two markets into a single market consisting of completed 
credit-card transactions. The district court’s treatment of the 
two sides of the platform as distinct markets was “error 
because the price charged to merchants necessarily affects 
cardholder demand, which in turn has a feedback effect on 
merchant demand (and thus influences the price charged to 
merchants).”167 
Turning to the question of Amex’s market power, the 
Second Circuit addressed the district court’s finding that 
American Express was able to impose price increases on 
merchants without attrition.168 The Second Circuit’s criticism 
of that finding was rooted in the two-sided output of the 
platform. According to the Second Circuit, the lower court “did 
not acknowledge that increases in merchant fees are a 
concomitant of a successful investment in creating output and 
value. In order to remain competitive on the cardholder side 
of the platform, a payment-card network might need to 
 
164 United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 196 (2d Cir. 2016), 
aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).  
165 Id. at 198. 
166 Id.  
167 See id. at 200.  
168 See id. at 201.  
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increase cardholder rewards—or, in other words, cut prices to 
cardholders.”169  
The Second Circuit held that, if the network did not 
increase cardholder rewards, thus ensuring cardholder 
demand, “merchant attrition likely would continue increasing 
as a result of the reduction in cardholders.”170 “Over time,” the 
court found, “the reduction in transactions could make the 
hypothetical price increase unprofitable.”171 
The Second Circuit interpreted the phenomenon of 
“cardholder insistence” differently from the district court.172 
According to the Second Circuit, cardholder insistence 
resulted “not from market power, but from competitive 
benefits on the cardholder side of the platform and the 
concomitant competitive benefits to merchants who choose to 
accept Amex cards.”173 The court reasoned that cardholder 
insistence was the result of cardholder rewards, which were 
the equivalent of a price decrease to cardholders: “A firm that 
can attract customer loyalty only by reducing its prices does 
not have the power to increase prices unilaterally.”174 Citing 
the district court’s finding that Amex’s market share would 
decline without the rewards, the Second Circuit observed: 
“That Amex might not enjoy market power without continuing 
investment in cardholder benefits indicates, if anything, a 
lack of market power; evidence showing that Amex must 
compete on price in order to attract consumers does not show 
that Amex has the power to increase prices to 
supracompetitive levels.”175 
The Second Circuit further found that the lower court’s 
“erroneous market definition caused its anticompetitive 
effects finding to come up short, for it failed to consider the 
two-sided net price accounting for the effects of the NDPs on 
 
169 Id. at 202.  
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 See id. at 202–03.  
173 Id. at 202.  
174 Id. at 203.  
175 Id.  
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both merchants and cardholders.”176 For example, “revenue 
earned from merchant fees funds cardholder benefits, and 
cardholder benefits in turn attract cardholders. A reduction in 
revenue that Amex earns from merchant fees may decrease 
the optimal level of cardholder benefits, which in turn may 
reduce the intensity of competition among payment-card 
networks on the cardholder side[.]”177  
The Second Circuit found that the Department of Justice 
could have met its burden by showing that “cardholders 
engaged in fewer credit-card transactions (i.e., reduced 
output), that card services were worse than they might 
otherwise have been (i.e., decreased quality), or that Amex’s 
pricing was set above competitive levels within the credit-card 
industry (i.e., supracompetitive pricing).”178 According to the 
Second Circuit, however, “the evidence presented at trial 
suggested that industry-wide transaction volume has 
substantially increased and card services have significantly 
improved in quality.”179 The court found that the “evidence of 
increased output is not only indicative of a thriving market for 
credit-card services but is also consistent with evidence that 
Amex’s differentiated closed-loop model, supported by its 
NDPs, has increased rather than decreased competition 
overall within the credit-card industry.”180  
The Second Circuit concluded that “[p]laintiffs bore the 
burden in this case to prove net harm to Amex consumers as 
a whole—that is, both cardholders and merchants—by 
showing that Amex’s nondiscriminatory provisions have 
reduced the quality or quantity of credit-card purchases[,]” 
and that they failed to do so.181 The Second Circuit 
accordingly reversed the district court’s decision.182  
 
176 Id. at 204.  
177 Id. at 205.  
178 Id. at 205–06. 
179 Id. at 206. 
180 Id.   
181 See id. at 206–07. 
182 Id. at 207. 
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The Department of Justice did not seek certiorari. The case 
thus might have ended with the Second Circuit’s decision, but 
eleven determined and intrepid co-plaintiff states, led by 
Ohio—the very state in which Judge William Howard Taft 
penned the seminal Addyston Pipe decision—183sought and 
obtained a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.184 A 
case of many twists and turns was about to take its final turn, 
this time into the history of rule of reason jurisprudence. 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit.185 The 
line of cases from GTE Sylvania to Leegin curtailed the use of 
the per se rule in assessing vertical restraints, and Ohio v. 
American Express expanded the rule of reason inquiry to 
vertical restraints that are ancillary to a two-sided 
transactional platform. Impact on interbrand competition can 
be assessed only by reviewing the effect on platform output: 
consummated transactions.186  
1. The Definition of the Market 
The Court began its analysis by identifying that the 
“interaction” between cardholders and merchants occurs on a 
“two-sided platform known as a transaction platform. The key 
feature of transaction platforms is that they cannot make a 
sale to one side of the platform without simultaneously 
making a sale to the other.”187 The Court reasoned that “[o]nly 
a company that had both cardholders and merchants willing 
 
183 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sat only in 
Cincinnati, Ohio at its inception and continues to do so today. M. Neil Reed, 
Tom Vanderloo & Stephanie Woebkenberg, A History of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, FED. LAWYER, Aug. 2016, at 34, 35.   
184 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. 
Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1455); Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017) 
(granting cert.).  
185 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2290. 
186 See id. at 2287.  
187 Id. at 2280 (citations omitted).  
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to use its network could sell transactions and compete in the 
credit-card market.”188  
As a result, credit-card networks are vulnerable to 
“[i]ndirect network effects,” which “exist where the value of 
the two-sided platform to one group of participants depends 
on how many members of a different group participate.”189 As 
such, a credit-card network with many participating 
merchants is more valuable to cardholders than a network 
with a few participating merchants, and vice-versa.  
“Indirect network effects” differ from “direct network 
effects,” the latter of which operate on the same “side” of a 
platform. For example, social media platforms exhibit strong 
direct network effects: the more members of a social media 
network, the more valuable the network becomes to each 
member. In contrast, indirect network effects operate across 
both “sides” of the platform—between cardholders on one side 
and merchants on the other. 
Because “two-sided transaction platforms exhibit . . . 
pronounced indirect network effects and interconnected 
pricing and demand[,]” the Court found that such platforms 
are “better understood” as having only one product: 
“transactions.”190 Under the Supreme Court’s reasoning, 
“[m]erchant services and cardholder services are both inputs 
to this single product.”191 The Court found it “[t]elling[]” that 
“credit cards determine their market share by measuring the 
volume of transactions they have sold.”192  
The district court erred in focusing on increased merchant 
fees because “the product that credit-card companies sell is 
transactions, not services to merchants, and the competitive 
effects of a restraint on transactions cannot be judged by 
looking at merchants alone.”193 Echoing the Second Circuit, 
the Court held that, to demonstrate anticompetitive effects, 
 
188 Id. at 2287. 
189 Id. at 2280.  
190 Id. at 2286. 
191 Id. at 2286 n.8.  
192 Id. at 2286.  
193 Id. at 2287.  
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“the plaintiffs must prove that Amex’s antisteering provisions 
increased the cost of credit-card transactions above a 
competitive level, reduced the number of credit-card 
transactions, or otherwise stifled competition in the credit-
card market.”194 
While the Court continued to speak of two-sided platforms 
or markets, the Court seems to have defined a “single” and 
(traditionally straightforward) market for credit-card 
transactions. The district court had examined transactions as 
a whole, expressed in the form of the dollar volume, when it 
calculated market shares and focused on “cardholder 
insistence” in finding market power.195 In defining markets 
and evaluating competitive effects, however, the district court 
restricted its focus to competitive dynamics among 
merchants.196 The Supreme Court, following the Second 
Circuit, redefined the relevant market to consist of completed 
credit-card transactions and refocused the competitive 
assessment accordingly.  
2. The Competitive Assessment 
The Supreme Court found that “Amex uses its higher 
merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more robust rewards 
program, which is necessary to maintain cardholder loyalty 
and encourage the level of spending that makes Amex 
valuable to merchants.”197 Plaintiffs attempted to show that 
the price of transactions was increasing, based on the fact that 
the increase in merchant fees from 2005 to 2010 was “not 
entirely spent on cardholder rewards.”198 The Court, however, 
found such evidence unpersuasive in light of evidence of 
increased output: “The output of credit-card transactions grew 
dramatically from 2008 to 2013, increasing 30%.”199 As a 
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result, the increase in prices was “equally consistent with 
growing product demand” as with market power.200 
The Court also noted that the increased output 
accompanied an increase in qualitative interbrand 
competition: 
Amex’s business model spurred Visa and MasterCard 
to offer new premium card categories with higher 
rewards. And it has increased the availability of card 
services, including free banking and card-payment 
services for low-income customers who otherwise 
would not be served. Indeed, between 1970 and 2001, 
the percentage of households with credit cards more 
than quadrupled, and the proportion of households in 
the bottom-income quintile with credit cards grew 
from just 2% to over 38%.201 
Further, the Court observed that Amex’s competitors 
utilized Amex’s higher merchant fees to their advantage by 
“charging lower merchant fees” and “achiev[ing] broader 
merchant acceptance,” which increases the cards’ value to 
consumers.202 
The Court also found that there was “nothing inherently 
anticompetitive” about the NDPs.203 The provisions “stem 
negative externalities,” such as a lack of “welcome 
acceptance,” which discourage cardholders from using Amex, 
thus discouraging investments in cardholder rewards.204 In 
addition, other card companies could “compet[e] against Amex 
by offering lower merchant fees or promoting their broader 
merchant acceptance.”205 The Court concluded that “Amex’s 
business model has spurred robust interbrand competition 
and has increased the quality and quantity of credit-card 
transactions.”206 
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With that, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit and 
introduced to rule of reason jurisprudence transactional 
markets in two-sided platforms with indirect network effects. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Following Ohio v. American Express, and further to GTE 
Sylvania and Leegin, courts will be required to assess the 
impact on transactions of vertical restraints that are ancillary 
to the operation of two-sided platforms with indirect network 
effects. Whether the Amex holding will have a broader 
application to multi-sided platforms remains to be seen. 
For now, Amex has provided the rule of reason with a new 
dimension that can be tailored, in the Court’s earlier and 
much-quoted language, to be “meet for the case” by accounting 
for a restraint’s “circumstances, details, and logic.”207 
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